LATIN AMERICAN PERFORMANCE DURING THE FIRST GLOBALIZATION BOOM

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1. Globalization and Growth

Some describe the first half of the 19th century as decades of lost Latin American growth while the region struggled with independence and the aftermath. Its growth performance in the second half of the 20th century was also disappointing. By comparison, during the half century between the 1860s and the 1910s the Latin American economies performed fairly well: they kept pace with European growth rates, grew more than other peripheral regions, but grew less than the big winners of the period, the US and those European countries catching up with Britain. The term “fairly well” may understate Latin American growth since, after all, it took place during a century that created a truly huge economic gap between core and the rest of the periphery (Pritchett 1997).

Table 1 documents that performance for real per capita income and purchasing-power-parity adjusted real wages of unskilled urban workers, both relative to Great Britain. Using the macro economists’ rhetoric, there was some Latin American catching up on the hegemonic industrial leader in Europe: per capita income in Latin America rose from 38 to 42 percent of Britain. Since Britain was losing that leadership to some powerful latecomers, perhaps a better comparison is with a more inclusive European industrial core: Britain, France and Germany: here, Latin American performance is a little less impressive, its relative position to that of the fast-growing core falling from 53 to 51 percent. Another relevant comparison is between Latin America and the source of its European immigrants: Iberia and Italy: here, Latin America improved its position from near-parity, with income per capita about 97 or 98 percent of Latin Europe, to a 5 percent advantage. Since it was a relatively labor-scarce and resource-abundant region compared with Europe (especially Latin Europe), real wage comparisons tend to favor Latin America much more than do per capita income comparisons. Thus, while Latin American per capita incomes were about 51 percent of the European core in 1913, real wages were about 59 percent of the core, an 8 percentage point difference. The difference in 1929 was even bigger, 15 percentage points. Finally, not every Latin American country grew “fairly fast.” Indeed, economic gaps within the region widened considerably: while in 1870 the per capita GDP of Brazil and Mexico were about 55 percent of that of Argentina, by 1913 they were reduced to 22 and 39 percent, respectively (Maddison 2001; see also Leandro Prados, “The Economic Consequences of Independence,” in Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, forthcoming).

This chapter covers the following territory: The next section explores the important disadvantage associated with isolation from regional and world markets and the transport revolutions that helped liberate so much of Latin America from that isolation. Section 3 deals with the immense variety in Latin America by

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1 Comparisons with the United States are common in the literature, but since nobody matched US growth
focusing on how the distinctly different country resource endowments unfolded during the period, and their impact on export specialization and trade. Section 7 pursues these issues further by assessing the connections between export-led growth and weak early industrialization. The penultimate section shows that inequality rose in most of Latin America up to World War I, while it fell thereafter. The correlation between globalization and inequality is likely to have been causal, not spurious. The final section offers a research agenda for the future.

2. Distance, Transport Revolutions and World Markets

In *The Tyranny of Distance* (1966), Geoffrey Blainey showed how isolation shaped Australian history. Early in the 19th century, distance isolated both Australia and Asia from Europe where, after all, the industrial revolution was unfolding. Later in the 19th century, transport innovations began to erode the disadvantages of geographic isolation, although not completely. The completion of the Suez Canal, cost-reducing innovations on sea-going transport, and railroads penetrating the interior all helped liberate that part of the world from the tyranny of distance.

Should this account about economic isolation apply to much of 19th century Latin America as well? Before the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914, the Andean economies -- Chile, Peru and Ecuador -- were seriously disadvantaged in European trade. And prior to the introduction of an effective railroad network, the landlocked countries of Bolivia and Paraguay were at an even more serious disadvantage. This was also true of the Mexican interior (Coatsworth 1981), the Argentine interior (Newland 1998), the Colombian interior (Ocampo 1994: pp. 185-8) and elsewhere. Thus, the economic distance to the European core varied considerably depending on location in Latin America. A close observer of early 19th century Latin America, Belford Hinton Wilson, reported in 1842 the cost of moving a ton of goods from England to the following capital cities (in pounds sterling): Buenos Aires and Montevideo 2; Lima 5.12; Santiago 6.58; Caracas 7.76; Mexico City 17.9; Quito 21.3; Sucre or Chuquisca, 25.6; and Bogotá 52.9. The range was huge, with the costs to Bogotá, Chuquisca, Mexico City, Quito, and Sucre nine to twenty-seven times that of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, both well placed on either side of the Rio de la Plata (Brading 1969: pp. 243-4). Furthermore, and as Leandro Prados has pointed out elsewhere in this volume (Prados, Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, forthcoming Table 4), most of the difference in transport costs from London to Latin American capital city was the overland freight from Latin American port to interior capital.

performance in its leap to world industrial dominance over these six decades, such comparisons seem irrelevant.

This section draws heavily on Williamson (1999).

This focus is certainly consistent with the new economic geography (Krugman 1991; Krugman and Venables 1990, 1995; Gallup and Sachs 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001).
Distance, geography and access to foreign markets explained a third of the world’s variation in per capita income as late as 1996 (Redding and Venables 2000; Overman, Redding and Venables 2001). Not surprisingly, therefore, geographic isolation helped explain much of the economic ranking of Latin American republics in 1870 too, with poor countries most isolated: Argentina and Uruguay at the top; Cuba and Mexico next; Colombia and southeast Brazil third; and Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay at the bottom. Of course, there were other factors at work too, like institutions, demography, slavery and luck in world commodity markets. After all, Potosí was a very rich colonial enclave in spite of its relative isolation, and the Brazilian Northeast was very poor in spite of its favorable location vis a vis European markets. Still, geography played a huge role.

The most populated areas under colonial rule were the highlands. The Andean capital cities and Mexico City were far from accessible harbors, thus increasing transport costs to big foreign markets. This was the case of Bogotá, Quito, Santiago, La Paz, Mexico City, and even Caracas, the latter located near the coast but with difficult harbor access. In contrast, the Latin American regions bordering on the Atlantic, with long coastlines and good navigable river systems, have always been favored (although Spanish colonial policy often served to diminish those natural advantages). These include Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Cuba and the other Caribbean islands. These nations may have failed for other reasons, but geographic isolation certainly wasn’t one of them. The harbors were more conveniently located in relation to the lowlands which were suitable for tropical agriculture, as was the case for sugar, coffee, tobacco, cacao, rubber, and other tropical products. The main constraint to expansion facing those land-abundant regions was access to labor, not geography and access to foreign markets. Slavery was the most common solution to the problem along Colombia’s Caribbean coast, in the lowlands of Ecuador near Guayaquil, in the Peruvian coast near El Callao, in the Caribbean and of course in Brazil.

Prior to the railway era, transportation was either by road or water, with water being the cheaper option by far. Thus, investment in river and harbor improvements increased everywhere in the Atlantic economy. Steamships were the most important contribution to 19th century shipping technology, and they increasingly worked the rivers and inland lakes. In addition, a regular trans-Atlantic steam service was inaugurated in 1838, but it must be said that until 1860 steamers mainly carried high-value goods similar to those carried by airplanes today, like passengers, mail and gourmet food.

The switch from sail to steam may have been gradual, but it accounted for a steady decline in transport costs across the Atlantic (Harley 1988). A series of innovations in subsequent decades helped make steamships more efficient: the screw propeller, the compound engine, steel hulls, bigger size and shorter turn-around time.

\[4\] They were, of course, well placed for the Pacific Coast US market.
Before 1869, steam tonnage had never exceeded sail tonnage in British shipyards; by 1870, steam tonnage was over twice as great as sail, and sail tonnage only exceeded steam in two years after that date.

Refrigeration was another technological innovation with major trade implications. Mechanical refrigeration was developed between 1834 and 1861, and by 1870 chilled beef was being transported from the United States to Europe. In 1876, the first refrigerated ship, the *Frigorifique*, sailed from Argentina to France carrying frozen beef. By the 1880s, South American meat was being exported in large quantities to Europe. Not only did railways and steamships mean that European farmers were faced with overseas competition in the grain market, but refrigeration also deprived them of the natural protection distance had always provided local meat and dairy producers. The consequences for European farmers of this overseas competition was profound (O’Rourke 1997; Williamson 1997).

Transport cost declines from interior to port, and from port to Europe or to the East and Gulf Coast of the United States, all ensured that Latin America became more integrated into world markets. The size of the decline around the Atlantic economy can be seen graphically in Figure 1. What is labeled the North index (North 1958) accelerates its fall after the 1830s, and what is labeled the British index (Harley 1988) is fairly stable up to mid century before undergoing the same, big fall. The North freight rate index among American export routes dropped by more than 41 percent in real terms between 1870 and 1910. The British index fell by about 70 percent, again in real terms, between 1840 and 1910. These two indices imply a steady decline in Atlantic economy transport costs of about 1.5 percent per annum, for a total of 45 percentage points up to 1913. One way to get a comparative feel for the magnitude of this decline is to note that tariffs on manufactures entering OECD markets fell from 40 percent in the late 1940s to 7 percent in the late 1970s, a 33 percentage point decline over thirty years. This spectacular postwar reclamation of free trade from interwar autarky is still smaller than the 45 percentage point fall in trade barriers between 1870 and 1913 due to overseas transport improvements. Furthermore, the role of railroads was probably more important. For example, between 1870 and 1913, freight rates in Uruguay fell annually by 0.7 percent on overseas routes, but by 3.1 percent along the railroads penetrating the interior, four times as big (Bértola 2000: Table 4.1, p. 102). Railroads were vital in developing exports, but they also served to integrate the domestic market.

Though impressive, it is important to note that the impact of the transport revolution on freight rates was unequal along different routes. As Juan Oribe Stemmer (1989: p. 24) has shown, overseas freight rates fell much less along the southward leg than along the northward leg, and the fall along the latter does not seem to have been as great as that for Asian and North Atlantic routes. The difference may have a great deal to do with the degree of competition among carriers and the role of shipping conferences in setting freight rates. In any case, the northward leg was for the bulky Latin American staple exports -- like beef, wheat and guano, the
high-volume low-value primary-products whose trade gained so much by the transport revolution. The southward leg was for Latin American imports -- like textiles and machines, the high-value low-volume manufactures whose trade gained much less from the transport revolution.

Still, these transport innovations significantly lowered the cost of moving goods between markets, an event that should have fostered trade. And trade certainly boomed in Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: Table A.2.1, p. 439). The share of Latin American exports in GDP was around 10 percent in 1850, while in 1912 it was 25 percent. Still, the volume of trade is not by itself a very satisfactory index of commodity market integration. It is the cost of moving goods between markets that counts. The cost has two parts, that due to transport and that due to man-made trade barriers (such as tariffs). The price spread between markets is driven by changes in these costs, and they need not move in the same direction. It turns out that tariffs in the Atlantic economy did not fall from the 1870s to World War. Instead, it was falling transport costs which provoked globalization. Indeed, rising tariffs in Europe were mainly a defensive response to the competitive winds of market integration as transport costs declined (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: Chps. 3 and 6). We shall see below that the rise in tariffs was even greater for Latin America.

It might be well to repeat this fact: while the first global century was certainly more “liberal” than the autarky that followed after 1914, it was still a period of retreat from openness, as we shall see again below. Yet, the decline in international transport costs overwhelmed the retreat from free trade, thus accommodating the trade boom between center and periphery.

### 3. Resource Endowments, Specialization and Trade

**Are Endowments Fate?**

This question, used by James Robinson (2000) to title a recent paper, has motivated much of the Latin American historiography in the last four decades. Do factor endowments best explain the per capita income gaps within the region exhibited at the beginning of the first global century? Do they best explain why the gaps increased thereafter?

In his survey for the *Cambridge History of Latin America*, William Glade offered a concise overview of Latin American diversity: “Between 1870 and 1914 Latin America not only exhibited increasing regional differentiation but also evolved quite a different endowment of factors of production, thanks to the demand-induced (but not solely demand constrained) development of the period. The resource patterns which underlay the region’s economies on the eve of the First World War differed notably from those on which the economic
process rested at the outset of the period. Glade adopted an intermediate position between two conflicting approaches to understanding Latin American development (Glade 1986: pp. 49-50). The dual economy approach described how the sources of economic transformation were first limited to enclaves exhibiting market-oriented production. As time went on, foreign demand, the transport revolution and the integration of domestic factor markets made the within-country institutional topography more uniform. Countries where the transformation was incomplete by World War I were ones where the original size of the export-sector was small, or where the export sector had limited capacity to replace traditional with capitalist institutions elsewhere in the economy, or both. Thus, incomplete transformation is explained by weak diffusion between sectors.

A group of revisionists argued, on the contrary, that this dual economy approach failed to give play to important forces that may have suppressed or even reversed diffusion. Instead, these revisionists emphasized that increased market-oriented production often strengthened coercive anti-market relationships rather than weakened them. Exactly how these forces evolved depended on initial endowments and related institutions. Different typologies have been proposed, in which endowments and institutions are assigned varying levels of importance, but in which globalization always has a powerful influence on outcomes. There are three camps: those who see the causality as running from institutions to endowments; those who see the causality as running from endowments to institutions; and those eclectics who see a two-way causality.

Among the eclectics, Celso Furtado (1974: pp. 50-3) stands out. He suggested it might be useful to think in terms of three Latin American regions: (1) scarcely populated countries of temperate climate exporting goods similar to those produced in Europe, offering an overseas frontier where high wages attracted free labor; (2) traditional societies specializing in tropical agrarian products which were labor intensive, the prices of which were relatively low compared to imports, and the wages in which were even lower; (3) countries exporting minerals, the production of which experienced important productivity improvements which, however, were limited to enclaves controlled by foreign firms. The main institutional aspects considered in this typology are the concentration and nationality of property ownership, the existence of coercive mechanisms for extracting labor, the extent of the market, and attitudes towards technical change. Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz (1970: pp. 321-43) added more institutional variables to the typology and Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) extended the approach even farther: to them, economic performance was mainly dependent on whether the ownership of natural resources was in the hands of numerous domestic

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4 Glade (1986: pp. 46-7). The Cambridge History of Latin America has other excellent surveys on this factor endowment and institutional diversity in Latin America (Bauer 1986; Moreno Fraginals 1986). The contributions by Alan Taylor and Blanca Sánchez-Alonso to the present volume are also helpful in understanding the availability of foreign labor and capital to Latin America during the long century from Independence to Great Depression.
agents -- like land in the Río de la Plata area, or in the hands of a few foreign firms -- like minerals in the
Andean and Mexican regions. For these eclectics, the implications for workers living standards, economic
diversification and inequality were profound.

Institutional determinists criticized the eclectics from a Marxist point of view. Thus, Augustin Cueva
(1977) insisted that the persistence of pre-capitalist relations limited the extension of free labor, which, in turn,
determined whether high wages, expanding domestic markets and rapid technical change would emerge.
Cardoso and Pérez Brignoli (1979) also contributed to this institutional-determinist critique, with a typology
very similar to Furtado’s: (1) the development of capitalism in new settler economies; (2) the transition to
capitalism in the Andean and Meso American economies which evolved differently due to an initial
environment created by the interaction between European feudalism and native institutions; and (3) the
transition to capitalism in market oriented slave economies. The institutional determinists have swollen in
numbers with the recent addition of some notable North American scholars. Indeed, Douglas North, William
Summerhill and Barry Weingast (1998), as well as David Landes (1998), have adopted the new institutional
economics to explain why Latin American performance differed so much from that of North America. The
legacy of colonial institutions, weak property rights, political decentralization, and political instability are the
main variables thought to affect growth. Factor endowments play a secondary role for the institutional
determinists. Thus, Robinson (2000) argues that similar resource endowments, organized in different ways in
terms of concentration of wealth and income, have produced very different outcomes in terms of human capital
accumulation, technical change and thus economic performance.

Recently, Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997) have made an important contribution to
the endowment determinist literature. They argue that “various features of the factor endowments of the three
categories of New World Economies, including soils, climates, and the size or density of the native population,
may have predisposed those colonies toward paths of development associated with different degrees of
inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power, as well as with different potentials for economic
growth. Even if, later on, institutions may ultimately affect the evolution of factor endowments, the initial
conditions with respect to factor endowment had long, lingering effects” (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997: pp.
275-6). The three-economy typology offered by Engerman and Sokoloff is exactly the same as that advanced
by Furtado some 30 years before, but the causality is different. Tropical crops, like sugar, are more efficiently
cultivated in large estates, thus favoring property concentration. Given scarce native population in those
regions, African labor was supplied through slave trade with a highly unequal income distribution emerging
as an outcome. The production of grains in new settler societies, on the contrary, never revealed economies
of scale, thus favoring a more equal society dominated by small and medium-size holders. The Andean and
Meso American regions were characterized by substantial native populations and a privileged few who
controlled the services of land, mineral resources and native labor. These mineral-based regions seem similar
to tropical regions, in the sense that both generated an economic structure where large-enterprises dominated
and substantial inequality resulted. Nevertheless, the explanations for the development of large estates is
mainly institutional, and they have their roots in pre-Columbian and colonial experience. In any case,
Engerman and Sokoloff’s great contribution is to emphasize how different societies with different initial
endowments yielded different distributions of income, human capital, and political power, all of which then
influenced the extent of the market, the development of institutions conducive to widespread
commercialization, technological change, and growth.

Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1994) also deserves an important place in this discussion. Like many others,
he considers international demand to have been the dynamic force during the belle époque. Differences in
performance around Latin America arose mainly from the relation between natural resource endowments,
export specialization and world demand, or what has come to be called the “commodity lottery” an idea
developed previously by Carlos Díaz-Alejandro (1984). Given the connection between international demand
and prices, on the one hand, and natural endowments and export specialization, on the other, economic
performance should have been strongly influenced by the luck of the draw in this “commodity lottery”. Thus,
the performance of the export sector depended in large part on demand booms and the price elasticity of
demand. Economy-wide performance depended, in turn, on the relative size of the export sector and the extent
to which the export boom spilled over into the domestic sector.

The “commodity lottery” is fine as far as it goes, but labor market institutions also have a profound
impact on the export supply response and on the size of any spillover to other sectors. Bulmer-Thomas treats
the whole region as labor scarce, and to deal with labor scarcity issues, he believes institutional explanations
are essential. For him, highly concentrated natural resource ownership made it politically possible to impose
a labor market solution that relied on non-market authoritarian coercion. This strategy implied technological
stagnation, as there was little incentive to increase labor productivity, and it had a deleterious impact on
aggregate economic performance in those parts of Latin America that used it.

5 The authors have some difficulty explaining one fact: similar endowments in the Río de la Plata and the North
American prairies led to quite different land distributions and holding size (a classic theme for comparative studies,
such as that of Adelman 1994, and on Argentina see Cortés Conde 1997).

6 This view is not shared by some scholars, most notably Díaz-Alejandro (1970), Lewis (1978), and Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997). We return to this issue below.
Different Endowments, World Markets and Different Patterns of Development

Natural Resources. With each export specialization came market characteristics that mattered to performance. Income elasticity of demand mattered, beef offering an example of high income elasticity during the first global century, thus favoring Argentina and Uruguay. The ability of petro-chemical technologies to find ways to replace expensive natural resources with cheap synthetics mattered. Chemical fertilizers displacing guano offers a good example, thus disfavoring Peru. Market structure and monopoly power mattered. For most of the 19th century, Brazilian coffee had a monopolistic position that allowed the state to impose export taxes and to raise prices (and revenue) by restricting supply. Similarly, Chile had a near monopoly on the mineral production of nitrates, which allowed the state to tax exports without losing its market share. In contrast, Río de la Plata was simply another entrant in the competitive world cattle market, and exporters were price-takers. Most tropical products faced competitive international markets, like cotton (Brazil and Mexico) and tobacco (Cuba). However, sugar cane offers a special tropical product case: not only did it compete with other tropical regions, but it also had to compete with the European beet root production, a situation which provoked a secular decline in the terms of trade facing northeast Brazil and Cuba.

Primary product export supply depended on many complementary processes. We have already talked about how the transport revolution reduced the cost of moving goods so much that relatively isolated regions suddenly found themselves integrated into the global economy. In some cases, natural resources that had previously lain idle were now exploited as the frontier extended. Northern Mexico, the Río de la Plata, the Amazonia and several other tropical regions had very low native population densities, and the expansion of the export sector obeyed the general laws of frontier economies unfolding the world around. But this “frontier case” was less common in Latin America where indigenous populations had already extensively exploited natural resources. A. Bauer (1986) lists three different Latin American landscapes where different factor endowments yielded different export-oriented economies. (1) Central México, the highlands of Central America, and the Andes were all the densely populated colonial areas where large estates, known as haciendas, co-existed with native peasant communities. In a context of ill-defined property rights, hacendados steadily encroached on the land of native communities, who may have resisted but were eventually absorbed by the haciendas. The land market was active as haciendas frequently changed hands, especially near new transport routes. Lands were captured for commercial use from another source too: secular reforms converted church lands. (2) In central Chile and northern Mexico, the typical frontier pattern unfolded: haciendas expanded into lands of the vast public domain occupied only by a marginalized native population, who were displaced. (3) While the role of the haciendas was important, the countless numbers of small and medium size farms in Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Chile and Colombia also played a role in contributing
to an elastic primary product export supply.

Diversity in export mix mattered. A well-known feature of Latin America was its highly concentrated export “portfolio”. Since primary products have always been subject to wide demand and price fluctuations, the more concentrated an economy’s exports, the more unstable the economy. For Latin America as a whole, the single dominant export product represented 53.6% of total exports, while the top two dominant export products represented 70% of total exports (Bulmer-Thomas 1994: Table 3.2, p. 59). These numbers are very high by world standards then and now. Still, large countries could more easily diversify, and they did. Thus, Mexico achieved a single dominant product export share in 1913 of only around 40%, while that for El Salvador stood at 96%. Small countries suffered greater instability as a result, and “balkanized” Latin America (see section 4) has always had small countries.

**Labor.** Population and thus labor force growth in Latin America between 1850 and 1930 varied enormously. The region as a whole grew by 1.5% a year (Table 2). The highlands from Chile to México recorded the lowest rates of population growth (1.1%), the tropical lowlands held an intermediate position (1.8%), and the more temperate lowland settler economies grew fastest (2.8%). As a consequence, the lowlands, mainly those near the Atlantic coast, increased their share in total Latin American population from 44 to 70% between 1850 and 1930, with a corresponding contraction of the population share for the highlands. This population shift reveals the dramatic impact of 19th and 20th century globalization as it broke down colonial population distributions, and pulled population down to the booming export sectors supplying world markets from the lowlands and the Atlantic coast.

From central Chile to central Mexico, there existed huge concentrations of labor which were mobilized through different means in order to meet the demands of the new market orientated production. Wages were very low in the Andean highlands, and thus so too were European immigration rates. The native population of the tropical lowlands did not easily adapt to plantation work, nor was it large enough to meet the requirements of this kind of export-led production. The population of the Latin American highlands may have been closer to these tropical regions -- like Perú, Ecuador and even Yucatán -- but those native populations were not able to survive the climatic conditions of the tropical lowlands. Thus, the tropical regions eased labor scarcity by importing African slaves from the 16th and 19th century, replaced after suppression of the slave trade in the 1840s and eventual abolition of slavery, some countries turned to low-wage Asian workers under labor contracts, often working under conditions of limited personal freedom. Tropical products were produced by low-wage tropical regions throughout the world. Table 3 shows that 47% came from low-wage tropical Latin America and 70% from the low-wage tropical world more generally. Thus, the attraction of free labor to tropical Latin America was not a viable strategy, since high labor costs would have priced them out of world
product markets. In Brazil, for instance, 4 million African slaves were introduced in 1531-1855, of which 2.1 million arrived after 1781, and by the mid 19th century more than a half of the Brazilian population was black. The labor market liberalized after the abolition of slavery in 1889, but the consequences for low wages and inequality have been long-enduring features of Brazilian society since.

The labor supply was completely different in the temperate lowlands of the Atlantic coast. These relatively empty areas were flooded by millions of European immigrants producing temperate climate products that could now reach world markets at competitive prices. This process is analyzed in detail by Sánchez-Alonso in Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, forthcoming. According to Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz (1986: Table 3), 8.4 million immigrants arrived in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay between 1881 and 1930, and the foreign born were a very large share of population in these countries. The structure of world markets for these kinds of temperate climate exports is also shown in Table 3. The contrast with tropical climate exports is striking: 61% of the temperate-climate world exports were supplied by high-income countries, and 26% by Latin America (mainly the southern cone). Low-wage regions played a marginal role in Latin America and the rest of the world. As the tyranny of distance weakened, the southern cone was offered a way out into the core, a process by which the frontier penetrated even more fertile lands, not less. As an outcome, wages in the region were higher than those in the European countries from whence the immigrants came. Thus, the labor market in these regions behaved quite differently than those of the tropical and highland parts of Latin America, both with respect to wage levels and with respect to their institutional features.

Comparing the Outcomes

When looking at the performance of different Latin American countries, it is useful to keep in mind that the nation-states created after independence often covered more than one region. Brazil offers the best example, but almost all large countries show a huge variety of climates and natural resource endowments within their own borders. Still, national level analysis offers suggestive insights.

One of the more striking facts is that economic differences among Latin America countries were greater near the end of this global era than at the beginning, as we noted in section 1. Both in terms of per capita GDP and real wages, the gap between rich and poor Latin American nations widened (see also Williamson 1999: pp. 112-19). Consistent with those forces of divergence, the settler economy (Argentina, southeast Brazil, Uruguay) share in total Latin American population rose from 11 to 30% between 1870 and 1930 (Table 2). The share of the highlands (Columbia, Mexico, Peru et al.) fell from 61 to 44% over the same period.

What about exports? Latin American export performance was impressive between 1850 and World War I, growing at an annual rate of 3.5%. Yet, there were huge differences in the level of per
capita exports between the settler, tropical and highland areas (Table 4): per capita exports in the settler countries were twice that of the tropical countries in 1912, and more than four times that of highland countries. While settler countries benefited by having large land areas and small populations, there are other likely explanations for these huge differences in per capita exports. To repeat one mentioned above, Latin American settler country exports were competing with that of developed countries, and, as marginal producers, they took a relatively high market price as given. In contrast, the price of tropical exports were set in a labor market affected by the after effects of slavery, by other forms of coercion, and by an “elastic” supply of Asian contract labor after abolition (implying a low and fixed reservation wage). Accordingly, W. Arthur Lewis (1978) argued that productivity gains were passed on to consumers abroad in the form of low and falling prices. Note, however, that while export levels differed across Latin America, their expansion up to 1912 was remarkably similar.

4. The Terms of Trade from Independence to Great Depression

The decline in transport costs created commodity price convergence in the Atlantic economy up to the Great War, and most of Latin America was part of it. Furthermore, commodity price convergence implied terms of trade gains for all trading partners since the price of every country’s exports rose in response to declining transport costs, and the price of every country’s imports fell. Of course, we would like to know more about where these forces were greatest, and whether other world market events had an offsetting or reinforcing impact on any country’s terms of trade. Did the tyranny of distance suffer a bigger defeat in the more isolated parts of Latin America or in the less isolated parts? Did the poorer regions gain less than the richer ones, or more? Which staple exports enjoyed more favorable world market forces? These questions connect closely to a very important and long debate about the secular trend in the relative price of primary products. This venerable terms of trade debate has its origin in the collapse of primary product prices during the Great Depression, but Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer and others argued in the 1950s that the downward trend was secular (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). This interpretation served to fuel the policy move in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, which had such clear autarkic outcomes. However, what these intellectual giants failed to appreciate fully is that during transport revolutions -- like that from the mid-19th century to World War I -- the terms of trade can (and did) rise for both center and periphery (Ellsworth 1956; Williamson 2002). It was not a zero-sum game. More importantly, they failed to distinguish clearly a profound Latin American turn of
events in the 1890s.

Figure 2 documents the secular movements in Latin American terms of trade between 1820 and 1950. The series plots the ratio of export to import prices, the so-called net barter terms of trade. From 1870 onwards, the series is the unweighted average for eight Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay; Coatsworth and Williamson 2002) while it is simply the inverse of the British terms of trade before 1870. For Latin America as a whole, the terms of trade almost doubled between the 1820s and the 1890s, forces that must have been very favorable to income, at least in the short run. How could the poor growth performance up to the 1850s or 1870s possibly be blamed on trade conditions? Instead, it certainly looks like world market forces were serving to stimulate Latin American economic performance during the first eight decades of independence.

Of course, country experience varied. While the terms of trade boomed for Argentina, Brazil and Columbia up to the late 1860s, they rose much more modestly for Mexico, and fell dramatically for Cuba (Prados, Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, forhcoming: Table 8). From the 1860s to the 1890s, the terms of trade rose for Brazil, Columbia, Cuba and the southern cone, but they fell for Mexico and Peru. After the 1890s, and long before the interwar world economic disaster, the terms of trade fell throughout Latin America. True, the collapse was less pronounced for the southern cone specializing in temperate climate primary products than it was for the others specializing in mining or tropical primary products.

In short, global market forces were, in general, good for Latin American exports over most of the 19th century, but bad for Latin American exports over the first half of the 20th century. What about growth? All economists agree that such terms of trade improvements must have contributed to a rise in income over the short run. We are far less certain about the long run. Indeed, Hans Singer (1950) argued that terms of trade improvements for primary product exporters might in the long run contribute to slow growth and modern development theory usually argues the same. After all, the stimulus to the primary product producing export sector is likely to cause de-industrialization or at least industrial slow down, and to the extent that industry carries modern economic growth, an aggregate growth slow down is quite possible. The jury is still out on this

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9 This pre-1870 proxy understates the 19th century rise in Latin American terms of trade to the extent that freight rates were declining on overseas routes between Britain and Latin America.
10 Prados (this volume: Table 8) also collects terms of trade estimates 1811/15-1876/80 for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and Mexico which have recently been constructed by other authors. Trade-weighted and unweighted averages of these five countries behave almost exactly the same as our inverse of the British terms of trade between 1855 and 1880. Between 1826 and 1855, however, the Prados five record a much more modest terms of trade rise than does the British inverse. Most of that difference is explained by the collapse of the Cuban terms of trade. When Cuba is removed from the Prados sample, the resulting average terms of trade rises at a rate almost exactly like that of the British inverse. Only Argentina is documented before 1821, but its terms of trade almost doubled over those years.
5. Export-Led Growth and Industrialization

Advancing in Circles: Industry and Export-Led Growth

By the 1960s and 1970s, regional analysts were obsessed by Latin American underdevelopment in general and the crisis of the ISI model in particular. While colonial heritage and 19th century nation-building were always viewed as central underlying causes of modern underdevelopment, studies of trade policy almost without exception started with the 1930s and the ISI model. Typically, industrialization was considered a post-Great Depression phenomena, evolving as a policy-induced reaction to the interwar crisis of the export-led growth model based on primary product exports and industrial imports (United Nations, ECLA 1966).

A reaction set in during the 1970s when historians began to stress the importance of what came to be labeled “early industry”. Many studies explored the features of early industrial growth, dated in some cases from World War I, in others from the 1880s or even earlier. By industry, we are not talking about handicraft production embedded in the agrarian-colonial economy; nor are we talking about primary product processing, activities that added very little value to these primary products before they were exported. We are talking about large industrial enterprises with an advanced division of labor and considerable capital-intensity.

Once it had been clearly established that modern industry had existed side by side with export-led growth long before the Great Depression, different scholars offered competing explanations for it. Some thought industrial growth was not possible if export-led growth was truly successful. Thus, the explanation for industrial growth had to be found in various constraints on export-led growth that would have allowed industry to thrive alongside it. One such constraint was protection. As we noted in the previous section, a central point of controversy is whether high tariffs emerged to generate revenues for the state, or whether they were consciously oriented towards the promotion of industrial growth. This discussion was related to another: were industrial capitalists opposed to export interests and their policies (following some Stolper-Samuelson predictions), or was industrial investment seen as harmonious with export-led growth (Lewis 1986)? Thus, while some scholars stress the protection afforded by tariffs and geographic isolation, others view early industrial growth in terms of domestic forces. The later includes the expansion of local demand, access to cheap raw materials and labor, better output prices and favorable exchange rates.

Before we can assess this debate, we need to define terms. If by industrialization we mean a process by which manufacturing output grows faster than that of other sectors for a long enough time to significantly alter output mix, then it appears that industrialization was never achieved in Latin America prior to the 1930s. To take the most compelling example, Argentine GDP grew at an annual rate of 5.5% between 1875 and 1930.

11 While the issue is not yet resolved, recent historical evidence suggests that Singer was right (Hadass and
while industry grew at a rate only slightly faster, 6.0% (Cortés Conde and Harriague 1993). If we assume that industry represented 12% of GDP in 1880, its share, according to these growth rates, should have risen ever so modestly to 15.2% in 1930. In contrast, between 1935 and 1960 the industrial share in Argentina increased from 15 to 21% (Vázquez Presedo 1988). Uruguay recorded a similar performance between 1870 and 1930 (Bértola, et.al.1998), while the industrial share increased from 11 to 23% between 1930 and 1960 (Bértola 1990). This important part of the southern cone did not undergo significant industrialization before 1930, and it seems unlikely that other Latin American countries underwent a more dramatic industrialization experience. Indeed, manufacturing output shares around World War I were considerably lower elsewhere in Latin America than in Argentina (Brazil 1920, 12.2%; Colombia 1925, 6.7%; Mexico 1910, 12.3%; all from Bulmer-Thomas 1994: Table 5.3, p.137).

Did this result arise due to some fault with Latin American industry and its industrialists? Maybe. But it could also have been fostered by what we have come to call the Dutch disease. After all, the relative price of manufactures facing Latin America fell dramatically across the century before the 1890s (Figure 2), a force that gave enormous incentive to primary product expansion at the expense of import-competing manufactures. Those trends ceased late in the century after which the relative price of manufactures rose just as dramatically (e.g. Latin America=s terms of trade deteriorated). Did this switch in world price trends provoke industrialization throughout Latin America after the 1890s, or did the region have to wait until the 1930s and the introduction of ISI policy?

The Limits of Export-Led and Industry-Led Growth

Between 1870 and 1913, the more advanced regions of the world experienced rising industrial shares and associated urbanization. Even world trade was increasingly industrial: while trade in primary products grew more than did that of industrial products in the early 19th century, industrial trade caught up late in the century and forged ahead in the early 1900s. Yet, Latin American exports remained primary products to an overwhelming extent. Were there limits to export-led growth?

First, World demand and prices set one limit. As we have seen, the relative price trend favoring primary products in Latin America turned around after the 1890s, a switch that must have been due at least partly to a weakened demand for primary products relative to manufactures. However, demand limits cannot be completely isolated from supply limits. If some “structural; limitation” made it difficult for a country to shift resources out of traditional exports into sectors with fast-growing product demand, its capacity to grow will be diminished.

Williamson 2001; Blattman and Hwang 2002).
Second, was Latin America more or less competitive in “dynamic” products, like those in manufacturing? Were there limits to industrial growth in Latin America? One limit to Latin American industrialization was the domestic market. For most countries in Latin America, domestic markets were far too small, a clear disadvantage resulting from the “balkanization” of the region two centuries earlier at independence. For example, around the 1850s, the four biggest Latin American countries (Brazil, Columbia, Mexico and Peru) had on average populations one-sixth the size of the four biggest west European countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom). Alternatively, the next five middle-sized Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba and Venezuela) were on average less than one-third the size of the average mid-sized western European country (Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland). Small populations made for small markets, but poverty, low per capita income and regional fragmentation made those domestic markets even smaller. In addition, income was unevenly distributed at the start, further shrinking the domestic market for mass-produced goods. And, as we will show in the next section, inequality grew even worse during the belle époque as Latin America responded to world demand with export-led growth. None of these factors yielded the kind of local market in which domestic industry could exploit scale economies and improve productivity until it could go it alone in home markets without tariffs, let alone trying to penetrate foreign markets.

During the 19th century, industrial growth was mainly based on relatively simple technologies, and by 1910 these had spread all over the world. Some Latin American industries did grow during this globalization process, but they did so only behind high tariff walls. Textiles was the leading sector everywhere around the world, but in 1910 Latin America – as illustrated by Mexico- was simply not competitive. As Gregory Clark (1987) has shown, compared with England, spindles in Mexico were half again more expensive, and coal was four times more expensive. Yet, wages were only half of those in England (Clark 1987: Table 1, p. 146). Was that cheap-labor advantage enough to give Mexico a competitive edge in home and even world markets? Apparently not, since Mexican labor was so inefficient that labor costs per unit of output were higher than in England. Thus, only tariffs insured the survival of the textile industry in Mexico, and what was true of Mexican textiles was probably true of most industries in Latin America (Haber, Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, forthcoming: p. 14). And, of course, things got even worse over time as tariffs reduced competition and muted the process of innovation.

The timing here is important: Latin America was simply unprepared for the petro-chemical industrial wave of the late 19th century “second” industrial revolution -- which embodied more complex technologies, larger scale and higher skill requirements. International competition in world manufacturing markets depended increasingly on skills, and Latin America, already having lost the battle over old industrial technologies, was
hardly well positioned to deal with this new competition. Even in Argentina and Uruguay, the richest part of Latin America, school enrollment rates in the 1910s were very low by North American and European standards: only 42.2 and 33.6% of school-aged children attended school in Argentina and Uruguay, respectively, not to mention Brazil with only 12.3%. Overall school attendance in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil were 52, 42 and 18%, respectively, of that in France, Germany, the UK and the US combined (Bértola and Bertoni 1998: Statistical Appendix; see also Bértola 2000: Chapter 4). Illiteracy rates made Latin America look even worse. In 1910, 62% of Latin America was illiterate, when the figures for North America were about 8 or 9% (Astorga and Fitzgerald 1998b: Statistical Appendix).

Latin America had to deal with the second industrial revolution before it had undergone the first.

6. Globalization and Inequality

Looking backwards while writing around World War I, two Swedish economists -- Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin -- argued that the integration of global commodity markets would lead to convergence of international factor prices, as countries everywhere expanded the production and export of commodities which used their abundant (and cheap) factor intensively. The historical evidence for the southern cone -- trends in the ratio of wages to land rents or land values from Argentina (O’ Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996) and Uruguay (Bértola et al. 1999) seems to be consistent with the predictions of Heckscher and Ohlin. They appear in Table 6.

The trade boom during the half century before World War I led to falling wage-rental ratios in relatively land-abundant southern cone, just as Heckscher and Ohlin would have predicted. As the exports of land-intensive products boomed, so did the demand for land and thus rents and land values. As the imports of labor-intensive manufactured products also boomed, the demand for labor fell, at least relative to land, and thus so did the wage-rental or the wage-land-value ratio. Taking 1913 as the base, the wage-rental (or the wage-land-value) ratio plunged from about 6.9 to about 0.6 between 1880-1884 and 1915-1919 in Argentina, and from 11.1 to 1.2 between 1870-1874 and 1915-1919 in Uruguay. Alternatively, the ratio of land rents to wages soared by about ten times over these four or five decades. This is a huge change in the relative scarcity of land and labor, with powerful inequality implications. As it turns out, these trends were typical everywhere in the land-abundant periphery which, like Australia and North America (O’ Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996) or like Thailand and the Punjab (Williamson 2002), were exporting to the booming industrial core. Exactly the opposite trends were taking place in Europe, especially in those parts of Europe which stuck to their free trade guns: i.e., wage-rental ratios soared in Britain, Ireland and Scandinavia. To the extent that land
holdings were highly concentrated at the top, these trends clearly implied falling inequality in Europe, but rising inequality in the southern cone. Furthermore, when the world economy fell apart after World War I, the steep decline in the wage-rental ratio stopped in Argentina and Uruguay and actually began to rise in the 1930s (Table 6). Presumably, inequality trends reversed as well.

So much for factor demand and globalization. What about factor supply? Sir Arthur Lewis (1954) used his famous labor surplus model to show how early industrialization could create inequality. According to his model, the worker fails to share in GDP per capita growth since elastic labor supplies keep wages and living standards stable. Lewis is quiet about what happens to land rents, but the classical model from which his was derived clearly predicted a rise. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1970), on Argentina, and Nathaniel Leff (1972; 1992), on Brazil, have both used the labor surplus model to predict stable real wages in Latin America, appealing to the migration of surplus labor from the Mediterranean. While the thesis that these parts of Latin America had more elastic labor supplies than the English-speaking new world has been rejected (Taylor 1994; Hatton and Williamson 1998: pp. 42-6), they did have higher rates of immigration and labor force growth than elsewhere in Latin America. This process of intensification may have suppressed real wage growth relative to other factor prices like land rents. After all, labor supplies were more elastic than land: land/labor ratios fell in the southern cone in spite of new land settlement and expanding frontiers. Meanwhile, rising export prices raised land rents and land values. Note also that the fact that mass migrations into Argentina and Uruguay dropped off sharply after World War I (Sánchez-Alonso, Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, forthcoming) is consistent with the turn-around in the wage-rental ratio drift in Table 6.

It follows that the Heckscher-Ohlin globalization model and the Lewis labor-surplus model both predict falling wage-rental ratios and rising inequality in the export-led southern cone prior to World War I, and the opposite thereafter. Regardless of which thesis explains southern cone history best, we need to know whether this experience was ubiquitous across Latin America.

Complete income distributions at various benchmarks from Independence to World War II are unavailable for any Latin American country, including Argentina and Uruguay. Still, our interest here is factor prices: unskilled wages, land rents, the premium on skills, and the return to capital. How did the typical unskilled worker, landless laborer or small scale farmer near the bottom of the distribution do relative to the typical landowner or capitalist near the top, or even relative to the typical skilled blue collar worker or educated white collar employee near the middle?

There are two kinds of evidence available to document inequality trends in belle époque and interwar Latin America: trends in the wage-rental ratio, which we have already explored, but, sad to say, are limited to
Argentina and Uruguay; and trends in the ratio of the unskilled wage to GDP per capita, which we have not yet explored, and which are available for seven Latin American regions between 1870 and 1940.

Table 7 reports trends in the ratio of the unskilled worker's wage (w) to the returns on all factors per person as measured by Angus Maddison's (1995) and Pablo Astorga and Valpy FitzGerald's (1998a) estimates of GDP per capita (y). These trends in w/y should approximate changes in the economic distance between the working poor near the bottom of the distribution and the average citizen in the middle of the distribution. Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay document the longest time series, and Table 7 shows that all three underwent a long, steep decline in w/y before it flattened out (Mexico) or even rose (Argentina and Uruguay) after World War I. The turning point for all three is 1915-1919, a result consistent with wage-rental ratio trends in Table 6 documented for just Argentina and Uruguay. Although its time series is shorter, Cuba seemed to obey the same laws of motion and the same turning point. Colombia's time series is even shorter than Cuba's, so we do not know whether 1910-1914 was a turning point for Colombia or not. The pre-World War I evidence in Table 7 is consistent with either the Heckscher-Ohlin or the Lewis explanations.

But what about after World War I? As the world adopted autarkic policies and as Latin America faced a deterioration in its terms of trade across the 1920s and 1930s, one would have thought that these de-globalizing forces would have had egalitarian effects. In some cases, that is exactly what we observe in Table 7 -- a rise in w/y. In Brazil and Mexico, we do not. A continued secular decline in w/y might be expected of Brazil, a huge country with severe regional inequalities, a relatively small trade share in income, and a large domestic labor reservoir with roots in the former slave economy. Mexico may share many of the features of the Brazilian economy, but it is complicated by the revolution and the reforms that followed.

The regions of new settlement documented in Table 7, Argentina and Uruguay, certainly offer the most compelling case for the globalization and inequality connection. These trends of rising inequality during the first great globalization boom and falling inequality during the interwar years of de-globalization are consistent with booms and busts in mass immigration and trade, but we don’t know which one mattered most. To the extent that the pre-war trade boom (and interwar bust) accounted for the pre-war immigration boom (and interwar bust), perhaps we don’t care which mattered most since they would have their origin in the same global forces.

Why did the real wage lag behind GDP per capita in so much of Latin America during the first great globalization boom? Is this evidence of some weaker version of the Lewis model, one without a constant real wage but with sluggish real wage growth and modest trickling down? Is it evidence supporting the factor-price convergence theorem? Or is it both? And why the common turning point for economies with such different attributes? Since it seems unlikely that such dissimilar economies could share the same turning point if it was
domestic forces at work, the most likely explanation probably lies with world markets. These countries were more likely to have shared similar price shocks which produced similar inequality trends.

Real wages lagged behind GDP per capita growth everywhere in Latin America up to World War I. Real wages outstripped GDP per capita growth in many parts of Latin America thereafter. We interpret these trends as rising inequality during the first great globalization boom and falling inequality during the interwar years of de-globalization. The correlation was probably causal.

7. An Agenda for the Future

In recent decades, we have learned a lot about the impact of globalization forces on pre-1940 Latin America, but much more remains to be done. This survey has raised five major questions that should keep scholars busy over the next few decades.

First: Did export-led growth suppress industrialization enough to account for the fact that while the belle époque achieved a half century of “fairly fast” growth, it did not achieve any significant catching up on the industrial leaders?

Second: Industrialization in Latin America before 1930 was modest at best, but it was fast afterwards. How much of that change in performance was due to the change in policy from pro-global to anti-global, and how much of it was due to the dramatic change in the terms of trade drift from steeply rising primary product prices (relative to manufactured goods) before the 1890s to steeply falling relative primary product prices after the 1890s? These two forces reinforced each other, but how much due to world markets and how much due to policy?

Third: Independence early in the 19th century produced market balkanization and anti-global policies that persisted for a half century or longer. Indeed, they still persist today. How important were those effects? How much did Latin America lose from moving away from a common market with a common currency (while the United States gained by embracing it)? If the impact was big, can Latin America get it back, two centuries later, by modern regional unification schemes?

Fourth: When and where does the motive for tariffs switch from revenue needs to industrial policy goals, and, more importantly, why? The most dramatic changes in tariff policy also seem to have been driven by strategic tariff motivation, a motive apparently absent before World War I while a dominate force afterwards. Furthermore, exactly how has Latin American trade policy interacted with the increasing availability of domestic tax instruments, with changing immigration policy, and with changing policies towards foreign capital?

Fifth: Latin America today is one of the most unequal regions in the world. How much of the unusually high inequality of income and wealth in Latin America today was driven to those levels at the outset
of and during the *belle époque*? How much of this Latin American exceptionalism has colonial roots? We know that both mattered, but by putting more empirical teeth into the answers historians might make an important contribution to the ongoing debate about who gains and who loses from globalization.

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Figure 2 Latin America’s Terms of Trade 1820-1950

Figure 3 Average World Tariffs Before 1950
Figure 4 Unweighted Average of Regional Tariffs Before 1939
Table 1

Relative Levels of GDP per capita and Real Wages in Latin America 1870-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>European Core</th>
<th>Latin Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>40</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. GDP per capita (UK=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PPP real wages (UK=100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>1913</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. PPP real wages (UK=100)

Source: See text.

Notes: European Core consists of Britain, France, and Germany. Latin Europe consists of Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
### Table 2 Population in Different Latin American Regions
#### 1870-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population (000)</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Share of LA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settler Regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>11936</td>
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<td>Brazil SE</td>
<td>2178</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>3410</td>
<td>31290</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tropical Regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil (others)</td>
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<td>31969</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
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<td>1552</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
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<td>42008</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Highland Regions</strong></td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1771</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>948</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>7662</td>
<td>16589</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5651</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1490</td>
<td>2950</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>18717</td>
<td>46122</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30530</td>
<td>104144</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Sanchez Albornoz (1986:Table 1) and IBGE (1990: Tables 1.3 and 1.7) for Brazil.
Table 3 Structure of world production or exports of primary products between Latin America and high-income or low-income competitors, 1913.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LA High Income</th>
<th>Low Income</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settler Regions (based on world exports)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
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<td>Linseed</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>average</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tropical Regions (based on world exports)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cacao</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>average</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highland Regions (based on world production)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrates</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>average</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Latin America from Bulmer-Thomas (1994: Table 6.3). High-income competitors: Europe, USA, Canada and Australasia. Low-income competitors: Asia and Africa. All averages are unweighted.
### Table 4 Exports Per Capita in US Dollars: three-year averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>Increment %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settler Regions</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropical Regions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland Regions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average above four</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Estimates on the basis of national data provided by Bulmer-Thomas (1994: Table 3.5).

### Table 6

**Wage/Rental Ratio Trends in the Resource-Abundant Periphery 1870-1939 (1911=100)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Burma</th>
<th>Siam</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870-1874</td>
<td>1112,5</td>
<td>4699,1</td>
<td>196,7</td>
<td>416,2</td>
<td>233,6</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875-1879</td>
<td>891,3</td>
<td>3908,7</td>
<td>174,3</td>
<td>198,5</td>
<td>253,0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-1884</td>
<td>580,4</td>
<td>728,3</td>
<td>3108,1</td>
<td>276,6</td>
<td>147,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885-1889</td>
<td>337,1</td>
<td>400,2</td>
<td>2331,6</td>
<td>541,9</td>
<td>150,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-1894</td>
<td>364,7</td>
<td>377,2</td>
<td>190,9</td>
<td>1350,8</td>
<td>108,7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-1899</td>
<td>311,1</td>
<td>303,6</td>
<td>189,9</td>
<td>301,3</td>
<td>92,0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>289,8</td>
<td>233,0</td>
<td>186,8</td>
<td>173,0</td>
<td>99,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1909</td>
<td>135,2</td>
<td>167,8</td>
<td>139,4</td>
<td>109,8</td>
<td>92,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1914</td>
<td>84,0</td>
<td>117,9</td>
<td>106,9</td>
<td>109,8</td>
<td>97,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-1919</td>
<td>53,6</td>
<td>120,8</td>
<td>164,7</td>
<td>202,1</td>
<td>83,5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1924</td>
<td>53,1</td>
<td>150,3</td>
<td>113,6</td>
<td>157,9</td>
<td>81,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1929</td>
<td>51,0</td>
<td>150,2</td>
<td>114,9</td>
<td>120,8</td>
<td>72,6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1934</td>
<td>58,4</td>
<td>174,3</td>
<td>113,1</td>
<td>116,2</td>
<td>50,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1939</td>
<td>59,5</td>
<td>213,5</td>
<td>121,6</td>
<td>91,0</td>
<td>33,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Williamson (2002: Tables 3 and 4)